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Abstract 
Age-specific arrest rates for the United States at the crime peak of the late 1980s and early 90s are compared to those 
for 2010. Three key features are explored; (1) The disproportionate decline in adolescent offending; (2) The decline in 
this age-effect up to age 40; (3) Offenders aged in their 40s who in 2010 offended at higher rates than offenders of 
that age at crime’s peak. The first two are interpreted as consistent with the debut crime hypothesis: crime fell because 
reduced crime opportunities made adolescent crime, and hence criminal career onset and continuance, more dif-
ficult. We interpret the third as a legacy of increased onset and habitual criminality fostered by exploitation of the 
plentiful crime opportunities of the 1970s and 80s. Implications for theory and practice are identified.
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Background
The great crime decline is probably the most important 
criminological issue of modern times, and it raises many 
questions. What caused many types of crime, includ-
ing homicide, other violence and car theft, to decline so 
precipitously from the early 1990s? What can society do 
to maintain this downward trajectory? What might be 
learned that can be applied to reduce crime types that 
have increased such as cyber-crime? What are the impli-
cations for criminological theory and the study of crimi-
nal careers? The present study contributes to discussion 
primarily with respect to the latter.
Various explanations for the crime drop have been 
proffered. These can be grouped into those relating to 
criminal justice policies (more and better policing; more 
imprisonment), those that concern the inadvertent con-
sequence of other public policies (abortion legalisation; 
reduced lead poisoning), those attributing it to exoge-
nous change (demographics; immigration; waning crack 
markets) or to long-term societal change grouped into 
the broad but vague notion of a civilising process (for 
reviews see: Levitt 2004; Zimring 2007; Blumstein and 
Rosenfeld 2008; Farrell 2013).
Much of the first two decades of explanatory research 
focused on violence in the United States. Two facts 
broadened the discussion. The first was that vehicle theft 
fell at a similar time and rate as violence in the United 
States (Fujita and Maxfield 2012). This suggested that a 
singular emphasis on violence is misplaced, and prop-
erty crime must be considered. The second was that most 
other high income countries experienced a crime decline. 
Hence the collection of work edited by van Dijk et  al. 
(2012) refers to an international crime drop (see also 
Tseloni et al. 2010; Knepper 2012; Tonry 2014).
The shift in research focus has been accompanied by 
theoretical progress. Crime opportunity theories, that 
is, rational choice and routine activities linked to situ-
ational crime prevention, have been applied via the ‘secu-
rity hypothesis’. Research relating to Australia, Germany, 
the Netherlands, the UK and the US provides strong evi-
dence that the steep decline in car theft, often around 
three-quarters, was due to the spread of high quality 
vehicle security  including electronic immobilizers and 
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central locking systems, with tracking devices appearing 
effective more recently (Brown 2004, 2013; Laycock 2004; 
Kriven and Ziersch 2007; Bassman 2011; Farrell et  al. 
2011; Fujita and Maxfield 2012; Van Ours and Vollaard 
2013). These studies posit that reduced crime opportuni-
ties simply made it more difficult to offend. In addition, 
there is increasing evidence that improvements in house-
hold security caused burglary to fall (Van Dijk 2008; 
Tilley et  al. 2011, 2015). In the US though, household 
burglary rates and larceny theft rates had been falling 
far longer than violent crime or motor vehicle crime—
since the 1970s and through the 1980s according to the 
National Crime Victimization Survey (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 1994). An extremely high volume acquisitive 
crime that also appears to have declined since the 1990s 
is shoplifting: Tilley (2010) lists 31 mainly situational 
measures that are likely responsible—from the meeting-
and-greeting of customers to RFID-tags or locked cabi-
nets for frequently stolen products.
Research into how changes to the opportunity struc-
ture caused the drop in violent crime is in its infancy. We 
anticipate that many types of commercial robbery will be 
found to have been directly reduced by security improve-
ments: bank robbery is largely a thing of the past, for 
example. Robberies of bus drivers declined because exact 
fare payments and cash drop-boxes meant the money was 
no longer a viable target. Violence against taxi drivers has 
fallen due to measures including bandit-screens, with in-
vehicle cameras reducing driver homicides (Chaumont 
Menéndez et  al. 2014). Transportation systems more 
generally have seen reduced violence with, to paraphrase 
Smith and Cornish (2006), situational prevention bring-
ing secure and tranquil travel. The design and manage-
ment of licensed premises is known to affect crimes on 
site and nearby. Violence at and related to major pub-
lic sporting and other events has been greatly reduced 
through situational measures including alcohol controls, 
organised transportation of fans, in-stadia segregation of 
rival fans and their monitored departure. Improvements 
to household security may conceivably account for reduc-
tions in intimate partner violence, particularly by sepa-
rated partners who can no longer gain easy access—and 
similar mechanisms may have reduced violence between 
neighbours, siblings and other acquaintances. These are 
examples of the potential direct effect of security upon 
violence, and we expect many others to be identified as 
research progresses.
The indirect effects of security upon violence are begin-
ning to be explored in terms of the diffusion of their 
preventive benefits. These have more specifically been 
framed as the keystone crime and debut crime hypoth-
eses (Farrell et al. 2011). The keystone crime hypothesis 
notes how many crime types are inter-related, such that 
removing the high volume acquisitive crimes caused a 
collapse in violence—just as the removal of the keystone 
from an arch causes all stones to tumble. For exam-
ple, stolen cars are sometimes used in the commission 
of other crimes, so car theft’s extirpation would have a 
much broader impact. Likewise, declines in stolen goods 
markets due to falling acquisitive street crime would be 
expected to reduce violence relating to those markets.
The indirect effect of primary interest to the present 
study is the debut crime hypothesis. This draws on the 
finding that the first and early-career offences of young 
offenders are more likely to be the high volume acquisi-
tive crimes (Svensson 2002; Owen and Cooper 2013). 
If security has reduced these crimes then this could 
have positive knock-on effects where involvement in 
one offence is causally implicated in the commission 
of another, for example theft of cars and ram raiding 
(Light et  al. 1993). A study of police-sanctioned offend-
ers found that “offenders who had committed robbery, 
burglary or vehicle theft as their debut offence were 
almost three times more likely to be chronic offend-
ers” and that “5 percent of the cohort became chronic 
offenders… responsible for nearly one half of all proven 
offences” (Owen and Cooper 2013; 4). Shoplifting as the 
debut offence was also twice as likely as the average to 
produce persistent offenders. Given that violent crime is 
more likely to result in formal sanction because offenders 
are more readily identified by victims, these official esti-
mates are likely to be conservative indicators of the role 
of the acquisitive crimes in determining criminal career 
trajectories. The same study identified offenders receiv-
ing formal sanctions at younger ages as those more likely 
to persist.
The debut crime hypothesis bridges concerns with pat-
terns of criminality to those of crime events, which have 
tended hitherto to be treated separately. Whilst quite 
a lot has been learned about the crime drop in terms of 
crime patterns less has been learned about how this has 
been expressed in changing patterns of criminality. Has 
the onset of criminality been delayed, with an unchang-
ing average rate for those who do offend (constant age-
related lambda)? Has desistance from crime, which 
ultimately occurs amongst almost all offenders, come 
earlier with unchanging average rates of those who do 
offend (constant age-related lambda)? Have onset and 
desistance ages remained the same, but rates of offend-
ing declined (reduced age-related lambda)? Or some mix 
of these? Moreover, is there a causal connection between 
crime event changes and patterns of criminality changes 
and if so, in which direction does it operate and by what 
underlying mechanisms? This paper aims to contribute 
to unpacking the change in patterns of criminality asso-
ciated with the crime drop and to understanding the 
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causal direction and mechanism, but further work will 
be needed. So far the criminal careers research literature 
does not appear to have engaged with the crime drop and 
there is little attention to the significance of crime oppor-
tunities for criminal careers (DeLisi and Piquero 2011).
The debut crime hypothesis suggests a causal direction 
between crime opportunities and criminal  careers, with 
three linked propositions:
(a)   The reduction in debut crimes has been brought 
about by security improvements, which make them 
more difficult, more risky or less rewarding.
(b)  A consequence of the reduction in debut crimes is 
that fewer young people become involved in crimi-
nal careers, which typically involve a wide range of 
offences.
(c)   A lower rate of entry into criminal careers brings 
with it a reduction in a wide range of offences, 
including acquisitive and violent ones.
Many criminal career research studies involve track-
ing cohorts of individuals to collect data on their levels 
of offending behaviour as well as other variables that 
may be associated with that offending. This sometimes 
leads to the production of catalogues of risk factors and 
sometimes to tests of specific hypotheses relating to the 
mechanisms that lie behind initial involvement, con-
tinued involvement and desistance from offending. The 
debut crime hypothesis suggests that there may be cohort 
effects brought about by changes in the nature and distri-
bution of opportunities for debut crimes. The supply of 
debut opportunities is not unchanging and if it shrinks, 
fewer young people will be drawn into offending careers, 
whilst if it expands more will be drawn in with wider-
ranging crime trend legacies. The 1950s to 1980s saw 
a blossoming of crime opportunities for cohorts of young 
people at peak crime ages, as stressed by Cohen and Fel-
son (1979), drawing many into offending careers. These 
lead to two further propositions:
(d)  More recent cohorts of those at the peak age of 
offending have experienced fewer opportunities 
than earlier post-World War II cohorts.
(e)   The legacy of the criminal careers kick-started by 
prolific opportunities for those in adolescence in the 
1980s should still be visible amongst offenders whose 
formative criminal involvement occurred at that time.
Recent studies of criminality have tended to emphasise 
population heterogeneity, according to which some individ-
uals have a set of genetic, epigenetic, family, peer and com-
munity experiences that dispose them to criminality (see 
DeLisi and Piquero’s 2011 narrative review of 364 criminal 
careers research studies from 2000 to 2011). Changes in 
the life course in the nature and distribution of these dispo-
sitional states are hypothesised to produce onset, continu-
ance and desistance from criminality. But there have also 
been suggestions that there is event or state dependency in 
criminal careers, whereby the commission of one crime is 
causally connected to the commission of another (see Heck-
man 1981, for a formal discussion of heterogeneity and state 
dependence and its application to female labour market par-
ticipation trajectories, and Laub and Sampson 2003, for its 
application to criminal careers research). Labelling theory 
emphasises event dependency as a mechanism underlying 
criminal careers: the bestowal of a criminal identify follow-
ing the commission of a crime and processing through the 
criminal justice system leads to fewer non-crime opportu-
nities and to  acceptance of a criminal identity that fosters 
continued criminal behaviour. Other causal pathways pro-
ducing event dependency could include positive feedback 
from offending–getting away with it and benefiting from 
its fruits; increased skills in offending; reduced inhibition 
from offending once rules have been breached; habituation 
to offending; drug dependence enabled by debut acquisi-
tive crimes; and increased time with offending peers who 
endorse, normalise or rationalise offending (see Light et al. 
1993 on this, specifically as it relates to car theft). The fol-
lowing further propositions are suggested:
(f )   Event dependent pathways to criminality are 
blocked with reduced opportunities for debut 
offences.
(g)   The effects of debut crime inhibition may be further 
multiplied by reducing the supply of young early 
offenders who can induct others into offending and 
hence trigger the onset of criminal careers.
Moffitt et al. emphasise variations in levels of ‘self-con-
trol’ as the main attribute that lies behind criminal dispo-
sition. Those with low self-control are hypothesised to be 
more liable to become involved in crime, are easily drawn 
into criminal behaviour (and other risky behaviour), and 
find it more difficult to extricate themselves. In their dis-
cussions of ways in which ‘policy-makers might exploit 
(low self control) by enacting so-called “opt-out” schemes 
that tempt people to eat healthy food, save money, and 
obey lays by making these the default options that require 
no effortful self-control’ (Moffitt et  al. 2011: 2673), they 
aver that ‘the idea behind crime reduction policy of “tar-
get hardening” is to discourage would-be offenders by 
making law-breaking require effortful planning (e.g. 
antitheft devices require more advance planning to steal 
a car)’ (ibid). This sits well with the hypothesis being 
advanced here. If Moffitt et al. are correct, this suggests 
an additional proposition for the debut crime hypothesis,
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(h) With security improvements, fewer neophyte offend-
ers are drawn into event-dependent versatile criminal 
careers.
Moffitt (1993; see also Moffitt et  al. 2002) proposed a 
taxonomy of offending that distinguishes adolescence-
limited, life-course persistent offenders and abstainers. 
The distinction is a controversial one. Sampson and Laub 
have been highly critical on the basis of very long-term 
criminal careers research, tracking a sample of males 
born before the second world war, who had initially been 
followed by the Gluecks from age 10–17, until they reach 
70. Sampson and Laub find patterns of episodic offend-
ing and near-universal desistance at some point (Samp-
son and Laub 2004, 2005; Laub and Sampson 2003). 
Nevertheless, DeLisi and Piquero report, ‘voluminous 
empirical support’ for it (DeLisi and Piquero 2011: 292). 
Moffitt was writing in the early 1990s when it appeared 
to be a universal truth that the majority of young persons 
(mainly young men) committed one or a small number 
of crimes in their teens then quickly desisted, and con-
stituted the category of adolescence-limited offending. 
In other words abstainers seemed  rare. More recent 
research in the United States found continuing low levels 
of abstention: across two successive self-report surveys of 
males and females each covering the previous 12 months, 
only 13.56 per cent of adolescents admitted no offences 
or antisocial behaviour (Barnes et al. 2011).
Of the smaller proportion of the population who 
become life-course persistent offenders, Moffitt writes:
With slight variations, this general relationship 
between age and crime obtains among males and 
females, for most types of crimes, during recent his-
torical periods and in numerous Western nations 
(Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983). (Moffitt 1993; 675)
and continues:
Until recently, scholars still disagreed about whether 
the adolescent peak represented a change in preva-
lence or a change in incidence: Does adolescence 
bring an increment in the number of people who 
are willing to offend or does the small and constant 
number of offenders simply generate more criminal 
acts while they are adolescent? Empirical evalua-
tions now suggest that the former explanation is cor-
rect. (Moffitt 1993; 675–676)
If Moffitt is correct, it follows from this statement that 
the crime increase in the 1980s and 1990s was primar-
ily an increase in the prevalence of adolescence-limited 
offending, and that the crime decrease was primarily a 
decrease in the prevalence of adolescence-limited offend-
ing. Hence, we propose that,
(i) The change in the adolescent component of the age-
crime curves up to 2010 is driven more by a decrease 
in the prevalence rather than the frequency of offend-
ing.
The crux of the present study is that we conjecture that 
changes in age-related offending patterns in the context 
of overall widespread drops in many crimes can be largely 
understood using the theoretical framework of crime 
opportunity theory and the security hypothesis that was 
described earlier. That is, we propose that the dispropor-
tionate drop in adolescence-limited offending is what 
would be expected were a reduction in crime opportu-
nities the cause of the crime drop. Put another way, the 
age-crime curves examined herein present a data signa-
ture that we interpret as consistent with reduced crime 
opportunities.
Our further conjecture is that crime opportunities are 
an important determinant of the rate of criminal career 
continuance, such that
(j) When crime opportunities are plentiful there is more 
continuance than when they are scarce.
Since adolescents with less experience and fewer 
resources for offending are more susceptible to crime 
blocking by improved security—as found by, for example, 
the studies of declining car theft where youthful joyriding 
declined disproportionately—there are grounds to infer 
a significant debut crime inhibition effect induced by 
improved security measures. The present study pursues 
this avenue of inquiry by linking changes in age-related 
offending patterns to key criminal career concepts. It 
identifies data signatures (distinct patterns in data that 
would be expected if a given hypothesis were true—see 
Eck and Madensen 2009) consistent with the debut crime 
hypothesis. We are far from the first to observe the key 
role of adolescents in the crime peak and crime drop: 
Cook and Laub (2002), for example, termed the prior 
crime peak an ‘epidemic of youth violence’, while Butts 
(2000) observed a ‘youth crime drop’. However, the pre-
sent study makes its original contribution through its 
particular usage and interpretation of the age-crime 
curves examined below, the way the findings are linked to 
theories of criminality and of the crime drop, and in the 
identification of potentially significant implications for 
theory and policy.
Method
The data are age-specific arrest rates collated by the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(OJJDP) from the Uniform Crime Report program and 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics.a We use arrest rates as a 
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proxy for offending rates, and for simplicity often refer 
to offending rather than arrests. However, arrests are 
clearly an imperfect measure of offending because only 
a fraction of offending results in arrest. Among the vari-
ous methodological issues, the most important to note 
here is that the number of arrests rather than persons is 
counted, which means some people are included more 
than once (Puzzanchera 2013; Snyder and Mulako-Wan-
gota 2011). For present purposes though, the arrest rates 
are the best available indicators and there are sound prec-
edents (see e.g. Blumstein et  al. 1986; Farrington 1986). 
Trends in arrest rates will, ceteris paribus, reflect offend-
ing trends, and while changes in policing practice and 
exogenous factors mean the veracity of the ceteris pari-
bus assumption is uncertain, the data described below 
offer good reason to conclude it is not unreasonable for 
present purposes.
The data are analysed for an aggregate group of prop-
erty crimes and an aggregate group of violent crimes, and 
for the following specific crime types: murder (including 
non-negligent manslaughter), rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, motor vehicle theft, burglary and, larceny theft. 
The violent crime group category comprises murder and 
non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and 
aggravated assault, that is, the serious violent crimes. The 
property crime group category comprises burglary, lar-
ceny-theft (including shoplifting, theft from motor vehi-
cles and bicycle theft), motor vehicle theft and arson.
The analysis spans three decades, using data from 1980 
and 2010 as the first and last years, and using a ‘mid-
dle’ year each time to represent the crime-specific peak 
arrest year. There is some variation by crime type in the 
peak year, the exceptions being burglary and larceny theft 
which, as noted, were in steady decline over the three 
decades and for which 1991 is used as the comparative 
intermediate year.
Results
Pairs of charts are shown for violent and property crimes, 
as Figures 1 and 2. The first chart of each pair (Figures 1a, 
2a) is the well-known age-crime curve (Farrington 1986): 
there is one line for each year showing arrest rates, with 
age on the abscissa and the per capita rate on the ordi-
nate. In the second chart in each pair (Figures 1b, 2b), the 
bars show the percentage difference between the 2010 
arrest rate and the peak year. Age is grouped in the second 
figures of each pair, for ages 10–12 and 13–14, and into 
5-year groups from age 25. This follows the format used in 
the OJJDP data.b Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 show age-crime 
charts for seven individual crime types. Figures  1 and 2 
contain most of the main features of interest but, by pro-
viding further detail, Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 illustrate the 
variation between crime types that is not evident in the 
grouping of violent and property crime.   
The overall shape of each age-crime curve is familiar: a 
steep rise from the youngest ages to a peak in early adult-
hood which is followed by a rapid decline that flattens 
and slowly tails off among older age groups. However, 
a difference in the age-crime curve between years (the 
lines) is particularly distinct in Figures  1a and 2a. Most 
notably, the arrest rate in 2010 was dramatically lower 
among the younger age groups. Property crime arrests 
(Figure 2a) exhibit a slightly later peak age in 2010 than 
earlier years. Note that, for property crime, the 1980 and 
1988 age-crime curves are closer together than those for 
violence because, as noted earlier, there was not the same 
increase in property crimes in the 1980s that there was in 
violence.
At first glance it is visually less obvious that, towards 
the right side of each of Figures 1a and 2a, the age-crime 
curves for 2010 cross the earlier year. This is counterin-
tuitive: it means that the 2010 arrest rate of offenders in 
their 40s and 50s (age groups 40–54 for property crime 
and 45–54 for violence) was higher than it was two dec-
ades earlier when the crime rate was far higher. This is 
shown most clearly in Figures 1b and 2b when the bars 
switch from a negative to a positive difference.
Figure 1 a Violent crime (age-specific arrest rates). b Percent change 
in violent crime arrest rates 1994–2010.
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The largest decline in the 2010 violence rate was among 
those aged 13–14, with a 61 percent decline, and there 
was a halving of the rate up to age 17 (Figure  1b). The 
peak age for violence was age 18 in all years shown, with 
a decline of 47 percent from 1994 to 2010. A decline of a 
third or more is evident for all age groups up to age 40. 
By 2010, offenders aged 45–54 had higher violence rates 
than offenders of the same age in 1994.
The largest decline in the property crime rate by 2010 
was among 10–12 year olds, the youngest ages for which 
data were available, with declines of half through to age 
16. By 2010 the highest rate was at age 18 compared to 16 
previously, though the rate had declined by a third among 
that age group. A decline of similar magnitude is found in 
most ages for property crime until age 40. In contrast, for 
age groups 40–54, the 2010 arrest rate was higher.
Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 show four individual categories of seri-
ous violence, and for the most part they exhibit features 
similar to the aggregate violence category of Figure  1. 
Note, however, that unlike violence more generally, mur-
der and forcible rape (Figure  3a, b) did not have higher 
2010 arrest rates for those offenders in their 40s.
Figures 7, 8, 9 show the three individual categories of 
property crime. Whereas all violent crimes peaked in 
the early 1990s then fell dramatically, there is greater 
variation in the property crimes because burglary and 
Figure 2 aProperty crime (age-specific arrest rates). b Percent 
change in property crime arrest rates 1988–2010.
Figure 3 Murder (age-specific arrest rates).
Figure 4 Rape (age-specific arrest-rates).
Figure 5 Robbery (age-specific arrest rates).
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larceny-theft had been falling for longer. Motor vehicle 
theft, however, exhibits a pattern very similar to that of 
the violent crimes. Here it is clear that both the peak of 
1990 and the subsequent decline relate almost entirely to 
variation in adolescent offending.
The spread of the age-crime curves is worthy of note. 
Generally speaking, the property crimes have very steep 
age-crime spikes as they are dominated by adolescent 
offending. The peak is less exaggerated for violent crimes, 
with forcible rape and aggravated assault in particular 
being somewhat less skewed, indicative of a greater pro-
portion of arrests among older offenders.
Among age groups from 40 to 54, it was evident that 
by 2010 the arrest rates increased compared to when 
crime was at its peak. This is in stark contrast to what 
would have been anticipated if the crime drop impacted 
uniformly upon the prevalence of offending irrespec-
tive of age. Yet it makes sense if we consider that offend-
ers aged in their 40s in 2010 most likely  began their 
criminal careers in the 1970s and 1980s. Offenders aged 
40–54 in 2010 were aged 24 to 38 in 1994. We conjec-
ture that these offenders are those who were old enough 
to have completed their debut crime offending and to 
have established themselves, whereas younger potential 
offenders were more likely to be affected by improved 
security measures. That is, the offenders in their 40s by 
2010 learned their trade when crime opportunities were 
plentiful; earning quick and easy rewards that meant they 
became less likely to desist. We interpret this increased 
rate of older offenders in the years leading up to 2010 as a 
negative legacy of the plentiful crime opportunities of the 
1970s and 80s.
Discussion
There is strong evidence that most offenders are versatile, 
or generalists, though there is some specialization. Most 
crime is property crime not violence, and so the careers 
of most life-course offenders tend to be dominated by 
property crime. Farrington observed that.
Figure 6 Aggravated assault (age-specific arrest rates).
Figure 7 Motor vehicle theft (age-specific arrest rates).
Figure 8 Burglary (age-specific arrest rates).
Figure 9 Larceny theft (age-specific arrest rates).
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“Only a small proportion of offenses in criminal 
careers are violent: 15 percent up to age 40 in the 
Cambridge Study … 9 percent up to age thirty in 
the first Philadelphia age cohort study … and 5 per-
cent up to age twenty-five in the Stockholm Project 
Metropolitan… In American research limited to 
the juvenile years, most recorded violent offenders 
have committed only one recorded violent offense. 
For example, the average number of violent offenses 
per violent offender was 1.32 for the first Philadel-
phia birth cohort and 1.38 for the second Philadel-
phia birth cohort … The same conclusion follows 
from juvenile offender samples; 83 percent of violent 
juveniles in Columbus committed only one recorded 
violent offense … However adult careers of violence 
can be much more extensive, at least in the United 
States. … [I]n Columbus between 1950 and 1976 … 
20 percent had five or more arrests for violence, and 
53 percent had between two and four such arrests.” 
(Farrington 1998; 435).
A more recent review concludes:
“In a long-term analysis of specialization using con-
viction records from the South London male cohort 
through age 40, Piquero et al. (2007) found little evi-
dence of specialization in violence and concluded 
that the strongest predictor of a violent conviction 
over the course of a criminal career was the number 
of convictions. More frequent offenders had a higher 
likelihood of conviction for a violent crime.” (Piquero 
et al. 2014; 14).
Recall that Owen and Cooper (2013) found that offend-
ers who committed robbery, burglary or vehicle theft 
as their debut offence were the most likely to become 
chronic offenders. Hence, by setting the criminal career 
research findings alongside the security hypothesis in 
the context of age-crime curves relating to the crime 
drop, we infer support for the debut crime hypothesis: 
as discussed above, the evidence showing that improved 
vehicle security reduced motor vehicle theft is largely 
unequivocal, and the fall in vehicle theft immediately 
preceded that of violent crime.
It is possible that homicides and sexual offences have 
been prevented by the removal of debut crimes. We infer 
support for this possibility from the fact that criminal 
career research identifies a lack of offence specialization:
“The analyses of specialization in criminal careers 
suggest that there is little specific concentration 
within offense types among most offenders. This 
overall conclusion holds with respect to different 
samples, measures of offending (including the incor-
rect presumption of specialization among sex offend-
ers; Zimring et  al. 2008, 2009), and time periods.” 
(Piquero et al. 2014; 15; emphasis added).
Further support for the interpretation offered here is 
provided by other key areas of research. A comprehen-
sive review of deterrence suggests that crime is often a 
relatively marginal activity and that even serious pro-
lific offenders, including those involved in gang violence, 
can be nudged away from it if the right levers are pulled 
(Kennedy 2009). Victims of one type of crime are dis-
proportionately likely to experience other types of crime 
(Feinberg 1980; Reiss 1980), so preventing one of those 
might reduce the likelihood of repeats by the same and 
different crime types—which also squares with the crime 
drop being disproportionately a fall in repeat victimiza-
tion (Britton et al. 2012; Ignatans and Pease, forthcoming).
The rise in cyber crime in recent years has led to specu-
lation that perhaps there has not been a real fall in crime 
but instead there has been displacement. The precise level 
of cyber crime remains unknown but it certainly seems 
to be widely experienced. Indeed, in terms of numbers 
of incidents it appears to have overtaken ‘conventional 
criminal victimization’ (UNODC 2013: 28). Two points 
are worth making here. First, our work on the crime drop 
has so far stressed that although security improvements 
have been widespread they have been expressed largely 
in terms of drops in the specific crimes where security 
improvements have been most targeted, notably vehi-
cle theft and burglary. The hypothesis that security was 
a major source of the widespread drops in those volume 
crimes because it restricted opportunity for them is con-
sistent with the expectation that where new opportunities 
for crimes arise, such as those associated with the inter-
net, increases in those crimes can be expected. It is not 
the case, however, that the fall in the one is  necessarily 
causally related to the increase in the other. This would 
assume that the same offenders switch from the one to the 
other which seems highly unlikely. The general evidence 
for displacement suggests that it is relatively uncommon 
and is incomplete (Guerette and Bowers 2009). Moreo-
ver, the rewards, motivations, tools, experience and 
resources needed for cyber-crime are very different from, 
say, those needed for car theft or burglary. The best evi-
dence available suggests a population of older and more 
organised offenders than found in past volume crimes 
(UNODC 2013: 39-50). Secondly, car theft and violent 
crime fell in the US from 1991 (burglary and theft falling 
earlier) and property crime in the UK from 1992. America 
Online (AOL), however, first made the internet public in 
1994 and initially its access was slow (involving dial-up) 
and to begin with it spread only quite slowly to those 
lower income sections of the population most associated 
with the commission of earlier volume crimes. Thus as 
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Farrell et al. (2014) observe, the internet arrived too late 
to explain the initial downturn in crime.
Conclusion
Our principal concluding hypothesis is that crime 
opportunities are a key determinant of rates of both 
adolescence-limited and life-course persistent offending. 
Further evidence is required from other countries, ana-
lytic approaches and data signatures, to confirm or refute 
this hypothesis. However the potential significance is, we 
feel, considerable, and more than sufficient to warrant the 
present study. Taken to its logical conclusion, it implies 
that situational crime prevention, particularly security 
technologies, may be more realistic means of influencing 
criminal careers than the developmental approaches that 
seem to dominate the literature on adolescence-limited 
and life-course persistent offending.
Our two further conclusions are as follows. First, more 
recent higher offending rates among offenders aged in 
their 40s suggest that both problem-solving efforts and 
incarceration policies may be relatively more impor-
tant for that age group now than previously. Second, the 
changing composition of the criminal population, in par-
ticular the reduction in young people entering the crim-
inal justice system on a long-term basis in more recent 
years, invites a rethink in criminal justice policy and 
policing tactics.
The steep decline in adolescence-limited offending 
that was examined here is consistent with it becoming 
less easy for young inexperienced offenders to embark 
on a criminal career when crime opportunities became 
scarcer. In addition, the fact that recent offending rates 
are higher than two decades before among those aged 
in their 40s is telling: these are the offenders who began 
their careers in the 1970s and 80s when it was easy and 
tempting. Once into a criminal career, they likely found it 
harder to get out.
We finish with an optimistic prediction based on 
extrapolation from the present findings: twenty or so 
years from now, offending rates for street and com-
mon crime among offenders aged in their 40s will have 
switched to be lower than they are at present. This will 
be beneficial legacy of our current low rates of criminal 
career onset and continuance that are due to reduced 
crime opportunities.
End notes
aArrest estimates developed by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics and disseminated through ‘Arrest Data Analysis 
Tool’. Online. Available from BJS website: OJJDP Statis-
tical Briefing Book. Online. Available: http://ojjdp.gov/
ojstatbb/crime/qa05308.asp?qaDate=2010. Released 
December 17, 2012 (accessed 19 February 2014). These 
were supplemented with motor vehicle data from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Arrest Data Analysis tool 
(Snyder and Mulako-Wangota 2011), available at http://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.
cfm (accessed 20-25 March 2014).
bAs the OJJDP data were grouped in this fashion, we 
assigned the group value to the mid-point age of each age 
group for the charts.
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